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Preface 
There is an urgent need to drastically reduce adverse environmental impacts 
resulting from prevailing economic activities. Even more important is the 
question of the future direction of economic development and technological 
changes. In this paper the authors argue, from a historical perspective, 
that this process will remain discontinuous and spatially heterogeneous, as 
a result of diverse policies and strategies. 
The authors illustrate empirically the argument that the process of eco­
nomic growth and technological change is not smooth and continuous. They 
demonstrate that various phases of economic expansion are driven by the 
diffusion of a host of interrelated clusters of technologies and that the tim­
ing of the transition from one dominant cluster to another is consistent with 
the pattern of Kondratieff long waves. 
The paper also illustrates that we are currently moving away from the 
old, materials- and energy-intensive development trajectory to a new future. 
There is a need to progressively close the industrial-ecology cycle and there 
are indications that this may indeed be possible, given the promotion of a 
range of carefully selected technological and policy measures for achieving 
sustainable development. One of the main goals of the Environmentally 
Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) Project at IIASA, is to point out such 
promising technological and policy alternatives. 
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Long Waves, Technology 
Diffusion, and Substitution* 
Arnulf Griibler & Nebojsa Nakicenovic 
INTRODUCTION 
M uch of the long wave debate is centered around the issue of whether long-term regularities in economic development 
exist, and whether there are associated fluctuations of relevant indi­
cators, such as prices, profit rate, employment, innovative activity, 
trade, investment, and other pertinent measures. For example, 
research has often concentrated on the questions of to what extent 
the fluctuations in price levels are cyclical, whether there is synchro­
nization, and whether the variations are only limited to monetary 
indicators or can also be extended to physical measures of output, 
materials, or employment. We will attempt to describe the long 
wave phenomenon as a process of s tructural change that goes 
beyond the question of the extent to which prices and some other 
monetary indicators might portray inflationary tendencies over a 
period of a few decades which are followed by periods of disinvest­
ment. We will try to show that periods of growth and expansion in 
economic activities are punctuated with phases of fundamental 
changes in the structure of the economy, the technological base, 
and many social institutions and relations . 
Freeman and others (Freeman, 1983; Freeman & Perez, 1988) 
have characterized such periods as times of paradigm shifts-times 
in which the dominating techno-economic paradigms that have led 
* This paper i s  based o n  a presentation a t  the conference "The Long Wave 
Debate," Brusse\s, january 12-14,1989. 
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to previous upswing phases reach the limits of their validity and 
begin to saturate. The development trajectories (Dosi, 1983; Nelson 
& Winter, 1982) under the old techno-economic paradigms often 
reach the limits of social acceptability and environmental compati­
bil ity, and sometimes , very s imply, the demand for goods and 
services begins to saturate . As Schumpeter (1935; 1939) pointed 
out,  during these periods innovative activities blossom. However, i t  
i s  not  the innovative activities themselves that have structural 
impact but rather  the diffusion of new technologies and institutions 
that emerge from innovative activities . To a large extent this is a 
social process , since the new technologies and institutions are medi­
ated by society, and can become accepted or blocked.  We will 
briefly document the diffusion of important technologies that have 
been pervasive in the sense that they have led to the development 
of a whole cluster of new activities that are associated with each 
Kondratieff upswing and its technoeconomic development trajecto­
ry. Pervasive techno-economic systems diffuse not just in one 
sector; they alter many economic and social activities (typical 
examples include steam , mass production methods, or  electricity; 
see, e .g . ,  Freeman, 1989). 
The evidence is phenomenological; we will not make any 
attempt in the present discussion to establish causality. We will illus­
trate that the diffusion of new systems evolves from emergence to 
growth to saturation, and we will show how the diffusion of perva­
sive technologies is related to the fundamental s tructural changes 
and development associated with each Kondratieff upswing. 
The effect of the pervasive diffusion processes can be described 
in the contexts of technological change, the transformation of eco­
nomic relations, and changes in the associated institutions. We will 
focus on documenting the growth of new technologies and the sub­
sti tution of old technologies by new ones during each of the 
Kondratieff upswing phases. This process results in increasing per­
formance that can be measured in terms of efficiency and other 
techno-economic characteristics ,  such as costs and prices . 
The results of the analysis of these diffusion processes indicate 
regularity, correlation, and recurrence within each cluster of inter­
related technologies . It should be noted here that the disconti­
nuities between different clusters of techno-economic development 
are not sharply focused, nor is the clustering phenomenon very 
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rigid. Nevertheless, the beginning of pervasive diffusion processes 
and the onset of saturation are, to a large degree, correlated with 
the turning points in the long wave. 
The clustering of innovations during Kondratieff lower turning 
points does not appear to be as pronounced as originally indicated 
by Mensch (1975), although more recent research, based on an 
analysis of the dating and frequency of innovations by Kleinknecht 
(1987), has given a more differentiated view, a view based on the 
statistically significant evidence of the discontinuities in the innova­
tion rate. In fact, there is stronger evidence of confluence in the 
saturation-rather than in the emergence-of the diffusion processes. 
In this sense, the diffusion processes can be seen internation­
ally as Schumpeterian bandwagons, that is, as a family of related 
systems that emerge, albeit with some time lags, in different parts 
of the world. The time span between the beginning of the diffusion 
of new pervasive systems-that is, between the leaders and the 
laggers-tends to decrease as the diffusion progresses, so that the 
process appears much more focused towards the saturation phase. 
Thus, we can speak of a visible catch-up effect in the diffusion of 
pervasive techno-economic systems throughout the world. While 
most of these results are based on the analysis of technology diffu­
sion, we have been able to document similar phenomena in the 
spread of some social and institutional innovations. 
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS 
Figure I shows one of the widely used indicators for the turning 
point in the long waves, that is, fluctuations in price levels (a 
measure already analyzed by Kondratieff in his famous 1926 long 
wave paper). With hindsight we see the occurrence of almost one 
full Kondratieff wave since the 1930's. The two price series, starting 
in the 1800's, give the indices of wholesale and fuel prices in the 
United States. The three upper turning points occurring in the 
1820's, 1860's, and 1920's are clearly visible in the raw data. For 
comparison we show in Figure 1 also the price (in nominal terms) 
of the three major fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. There is a 
sustained inflationary trend starting in the 1940's, reaching a peak 
of energy prices and other basic materials in the early 1980's, after 
which the curve portrays deflationary tendencies dming the last few 
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Figure 1. Energy Prices and Fuel and Wholesale Price Index, U.S. 
years. In the meantime, oil and natural gas prices have returned to 
their pre-1970 levels in real terms. Despite many turbulent events 
and acute crises, and the complete transformation of the United 
States froITl an agrarian to industrial society over the las t  two 
centuries, the long term price trends have been surprisingly stable, 
with the exception of the four pronounced flares during the 
Kondratieff turning points .  
Figure 2 emphasizes this remarkable long term stability of 
energy prices. It  gives the price of oil since 1863 in constant 1958 
dollars per kilowatt year. The second curve shows the composite 
price of all energy sources in the American economy, weighted by 
their relative shares in total primary energy for each period. The 
figure clearly demonstrates that the price flares since the OPEC oil 
embargo have been deflated back to historical levels. Thus, in spite 
of the recurring brief epiwdes of extreme price volatility, crude oil 
(and energy in general) has shown rather remarkable price stability 
in real terms over its more than century-long history as one of the 
major world commodities. With the exception of three prominent 
price flares in the 1860's, prior to the Great Depression and after 
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Figure 2. Real Composite Energy and Crude Oil Prices, U.S. 
1973, the price of crude oil fluctua te d wi thin the relatively narrow 
ra nge of abou t $ 13/bbl (i n 1987 dollars, or abou t $18/kWyr in 
cons tant 1958 dollars as show n in the figure). We have shown 
elsewhere (Nakice novic, 1988; Gnlbler, 1987) tha t periods of price 
vola tili ty mark impor tan t tur ni ng poi nts in the s tructural evolution 
i n  energy (and also o ther sys tems, such as infras truc tures) in terms 
of the sa tura tio n of the predomi na nt technological sys tem, as well 
as in the i ntroduc tion of new o nes. 
Agains t the backgrou nd of this ra ther s ta tic indica tor (despi te 
the four pro nou nce d flares arou nd the s ta tionary tre nd), we will 
now docume nt  the dynamic cha nges in the replacement o f  ol d by 
new pervasive tech nologies. We begin by describing the develop­
men t of infras truc tures. 
GROWTH OF INFRASTRUCTURES 
Figure 3 shows the i ncrease i n  mileage of the three mos t 
impor tan t tra nspor t infrastruc tures: ca nals , railways, a nd paved 
roads. Duri ng the las t 200 years the le ng th of tra nspor t i nfrastruc-
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tures in the United States has increased by almost five orders of 
magnitude. The development of canals started saturating in the 
1850's and showed a clear dis investment thereafter. The expansion 
of railways leveled off in the 1920's, and in the meantime the net­
work has declined by a third of the maximum length .  The growth 
rate of the road network has also been continuously declining over 
the last decade. 
The sequences of the development of these three infrastruc­
tures appears in Figure 4 as a remarkably regular process when 
their size is plotted as a percent of the saturation level . The rapid 
expansion of canals lasted until 1836, and from then on the growth 
rate declined toward the saturation period. With the onset of the 
saturation of canals, railroad expansion began to grow exponential­
ly until 1891. The development of paved roads is almost a recur­
rence of the expansion pulses in canals and railroads, with an 
inflection point in 1946 and with probable saturation towards the 
end of this century. It is interesting to note here that, measuring 
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Figure 3. Growth of Length of Transport Infrastructures, U.S. 
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Figure 4. Growth of Transport Infrastructures as Percent of Saturation Level, U.S. 
the distance between the respective inflection points, we see that 
the three growth pulses are separated in time by 55 years . The 
complete diffusion processes are rather lengthy, spanning more 
than s ix decades.l 
Figure 5 gives the same data plotted on a logarithmic scale as 
the ratio of the growth level reached in a given year, d ivided by the 
amount of growth left to the saturation level. 2 This is a convenient 
way of presenting S-shaped diffusion processes as s traight lines. For 
1 The duration of the diffusion process is  conveniently measured as the time that 
elapses between the achievement of 10% and 90% growth of the saturation level. We 
call this measure At. 
2 Historical data and filled logistic CUlve are transformed as X/(IC-X), where x 
denotes the actual infrastructure length in a given year and IC the estimated saturation 
level. The data and the estimated logistic trend are plotted as fractional shares of the 
saturation level, f=x/IC, which simplifies the transformation to //(1 -j), the level of 
relative growth achieved divided by the remaining potential. Transformed in this way, 
the data appear to be on a straight line, which is the estimated logistic function. 
Without this transformation, the data and the trend curve would portray the same 
S-shaped growth as shown for the three transport infrastructures in Figure 4: canals, 
railways, and surfaced roads. 
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Figure 5. Logistic Growth of Transport Infrastructures, U.S. 
purposes of clarity, only the expansion phases of the three growth 
pulses are shown, and the decline that follows is omitted. 
The next two figures document both the expansion and the 
decline phases of the railway network in six industrialized countries, 
in order to' illustrate to what extent the development of railroads 
has converged internationally. Figure 6 shows the diffusion of 
railroads starting from top to bottom in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Germany (Federal Republic of Germany after 
the Second World War). Figure 7 shows in the same sequence the 
expansion and contraction of railroads in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (Austria after the First World War) and France, and the two 
growth pulses of the railways in Russia and the Soviet Union. While 
the growth processes and construction phases differ both in slope 
and, to a lesser degree, in duration, there is no doubt that there is 
a high degree of synchronization in the ultimate saturation of rail­
way networks in the industrialized countries during the 1920's. The 
most interesting cases are France and the Soviet Union, since they 
show departures from the development pattern of the other coun­
tries. 
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Figure 6. Growth and Decline of Railways, U.S., U.K. and F.R.G. 
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Figure 7. Growth and Decline of Railways, Austria, France and U.S.S.R. 
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In France there are two unusual features worth noting. The 
first is that the turbulence during the saturation phase is very large 
compared to other countries; second is the introduction of the 
TGV (train a gmnde vitesse) in the railway grid during the 1 970's . 
Without the additional infrastructure dedicated to the TGV, the 
length of the French railway system continues to decline along the 
historical path, while the inclusion of the TGV l inks could indicate 
the beginning of a trend reversal .  Thus, one could speculate 
whether the introduction of rapid rail transport systems does not, 
in fac t, represent the beginning of a new transport infrastructure.  
In order to document this possibility, the growth of TGV lines is 
plotted in the lower right corner of the graph. 
The development path of railroads in Tzarist Russia is almost 
identical to the patterns observed in the other five countries, until 
the onset of saturation in the 1 920's . This period also coincides 
with the October Revolution. It is possible that the reconstruction 
period following the revolution is the reason for the further expan­
sion of railroads in the Soviet Union. Thus, we see here two consec­
utive expansion pulses of the railway network. After saturation of 
the first pulse, the second followed a similar trajectory with a 
sl ightly longer duration and is now entering its own saturation 
phase.  
These six examples clearly show that the development of a 
particular techno-economic tr�ectory follows similar paths in coun­
tries with fundamentally d ifferent social and economic relations, 
different technological bases, and, certainly, different initial condi­
tions . In this sense we can speak of international bandwagons in the 
diffusion of pervasive techno-economic systems. 
Figure 8 summarizes the spread of railroads and associated 
technologies in a number of countries, including the six examples 
given above . The first cluster of  curves shows a rather narrow band 
in the growth of railway networks . The second band of trajectories 
shows another important innovation in the railway systems that 
diffused during the period when most of the world's railways were 
already declining: namely, the replacement of s teel by diesel! 
electric locomotives .  This development trajectory is also confined to 
a rather narrow band that is intersected with the major irregularity 
of this process, that is, the second growth pulse of the railways in 
the Soviet Union. For reasons of clarity, other associated technolog-
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Figure 8. Diffusion of Railways and Replacement of Steam Locomotives, World. 
ical changes in  the spread of railways are not induded, such as the 
replacement of wood by treated wooden ties,  iron by s teel rails ,  and 
numerous other innovations that made railroads one of the most 
important factors in economic development between the 1860's and 
the 1920's . 
This summary figure illustrates that the replacement of the 
rolling stock symbolized by the diffusion of diesel/electric locomo­
tives was much faster  than the development of the railroad infra­
s tructures, with a At in the order of fifteen years , compared to a At 
for the expansion of railways of about seven decades.  
This process was not only swift but it  also represents another  
important feature of  technological change-the substitution of  old 
by new systems.  According to Montroll, "evolution is the result of a 
sequence of replacements" ( 1978: 4633; italics added) .  Often, new 
technologies create new "niches" that lead to products and services 
hitherto unavailable.  More frequently, though, successful innova­
tions can preempt an established niche by providing improved  
technical and economic performance or  the social acceptability of 
existing services through new ways of fulfilling them.  Circumstantial 
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evidence shows that many pervasive systems evolved through both 
of these evolutionary paths. First, they replaced older technologies, 
and then they created new and additional market segments that did 
not exist before. We will illustrate this feature of the diffusion of 
techno-economic systems by briefly sketching the spread of the 
automobile. 
Figure 9 shows the "fleets" of road horses and cars in the 
United States. During the last century horse-driven vehicles were 
the predominant form of road travel. In the United States the 
number of road horses increased to more than three million by the 
1920's, declining rapidly thereafter. After the advent of the horse­
less carriage towards the end of the last century, the spread of the 
automobile was very swift, until the 1930's, when a structural 
transition occurred in the growth path, followed by lower expan­
sion rates. 
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Figure 9. Population of Road Horses and Number of Cars, U.S. 
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Figure 1 0  indicates that this structural change was caused by the 
beginning of a new phase in the diffusion process of the automo­
bile. The figure shows the shares of cars and road horses plotted on 
a logarithmic scale as ratios of one to the other. 3 By 1 930 horses 
had virtually disappeared from American roads, indicating that this 
technological trajectory fulfilled the niche previously occupied by 
horses. Additional evidence is seen in the fundamental transforma­
tion of the vehicles themselves after the 1 930's ,  and the numerous 
innovations in production methods and vehicle design that provid­
ed for higher performance, more comfort, and a lower price. A 
number of changes in other sectors also made the automobile more 
attractive and accessible to a wider public much beyond the relative­
ly small circle of horse-driven carriage owners and users. Examples 
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Figure 10. Replacement of Horses by Cars, U.S. 
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3 The fractional shares, f, are not plotted directly but as the linear transformation 
of the logistic curve, i.e.,j/(l-l!, as the ratio of the market share of cars (j) over the 
market share of horses (I-I!. This form of presentation reveals the logistic substitution 
path as a linear secular trend. The model was formulated by Fisher & Pry (1971) and 
has been subsequently been applied in many case studies. 
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of these changes include innovations in the steel industry (higher 
quality alloys and wider sheet metal) and petrochemical industry 
(catalytic cracking and high quality rubber), and a host of other 
institutional changes which eventually even led to automobile com­
patible settlement patterns . Incidentally, the high usage of automo­
biles today has led to numerous environmental problems, but in a 
historical perspective the replacement of horses by cars alleviated 
one of the grave environmental problems of the c ities of the last 
century, namely, horse manure in the streets. 
The complete replacement of horses by cars lasted about 30 
years in the United States (with a At of about  fifteen years) . Figure 
11 shows the equivalent process in the United Kingdom for all road 
vehicles classified into two groups: (1) all horse-driven vehicles and 
(2) all internal combustion engine propelled vehicles . The complete 
replacement process lasted about as long as i n  the United States 
and also ended by 1930. 
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Figure 11. Replacement of Horse by Motor Vehicles, U.K. 
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Figure 12 summarizes the replacement of horses by automobiles 
in a number of countries as a rather quick and focused substitution 
path, starting around the turn of the century and ending by 1930. 
Thereafter a slower diffusion phase was initiated, as illustrated 
previously for the United States. This second pulse in the spread of 
automobiles was less swift and is not yet completed, although there 
are indications of a beginning saturation phase in most countries. 
Overlaid over this diffusion cluster is the development of associated 
infrastructures, such as oil pipelines, surfaced roads, and motor 
ships. The cross enhancement that characterizes the pervasive 
nature of these systems, or whole families of related systems, was an 
important aspect of the last Kondratieff upswing. 
Up to now we have described two important features of the 
diffusion processes: growth and the replacement of old by new. 
Often, however, we not only observe a succession of growth pulses 
(for example, the two development phases of the railroad system in 
Russia and the Soviet Union) or the two different modes in the 
spread of the automobile, but also a succession of substitution 
processes. Rarely are only two technologies, production processes, 
goods or services competing in a market. More often the variation 
is much larger. Figure 13 illustrates for the United Kingdom a 
typical example that has been documented in a number of coun­
tries: that of the successive replacement of sailing ships by steamers 
and, later, motor ships, measured by tonnage of ships registered in 
each class. The dynamics of the process is quite long, with a .6.t in 
the order of 70 years (comparable to the duration of the diffusion 
of railroads), with steam ships saturating in the 1930's.4 
4 The fractional shares, f, are not plotted directly but as the linear transformation 
of the logistic cUlVe (see note 3). The presence of some linear trends in Figure 14 
indicates where the fractional substitution of the three classes of merchant vessels 
follows a logistic cUlVe. In dealing with more than two competing technologies, we 
must generalize the Fisher & Pry (1971) model, since in such cases logistic substitution 
cannot be preselVed in all phases of the substitution process. Every competitor 
undergoes three distinct substitution phases: growth, saturation, and decline. This is 
illustrated by the substitution path of steam ships, which cUlVes through a maximum 
from increasing to declining market shares (see Figure 14). In the model of the 
substitution process, we assume that only one competitor is in the saturation phase at 
any given time, that declining technologies fade away steadily at logistic rates, and that 
new competitors enter the market and grow at logistic rates. As a result, the saturating 
technology is left with the residual market shares (i.e., the difference between 1 and 
the sum of fractional market shares of all other competitors) and is forced to follow a 
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Figure 13. Substitution of Sailing, Steam and Motor Ships, U.K. 
The next example in Figure 14 shows an even higher degree of 
complexity, that of the replacement process in five different steel 
production methods in (the Federal Republic of) Germany. Again, 
this is indicative of the technological changes in the steel industries 
of other countries, although the substitution processes in o ther 
countries are more regular. The process is rather irregular, with .t.ts 
varying from one s teel production method to another. Neverthe­
less, there is a recurring pattern of s tructural discontinuities in the 
evolution of this system: saturation of the puddle s teel production 
process around 1860, Bessemer and open hearth processes by the 
1930's and the saturation of the basic oxygen process during the 
1970's  (Grilbler, 1987). The sustained increase in the electric arc 
furnaces parallels the higher demand for recycled high quality s teel . 
nonlogistic path that joins its per'iod of growth to its subsequent period of decline. 
After the current, saturating competitor has reached a logistic rate of decline, the next 
oldest competitor enters its saturation phase, and the process is repeated until all but 
the most recent competitor are in decline. A more comprehensive description of the 
model and assumptions is given in Nakicenovic (1979). 
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Figure 14. Substitution of Steel Production Methods, Germany (F.R.G.). 
Figure 15 shows the substitution pattern in primary energy 
sources in the United States. Similar paths of technological change 
can be found in other countries, although the advantage of using 
the United States as the main example is that the historical records 
include consumption rates of older energy sources, such as fuel­
wood and the energy equivalent of the feed required by working 
animals. Energy substitution is portrayed by very long time con­
stants with a 6.t of about 90 years in the United States and 100 years 
at the global level. The saturation periods of each consecutive 
energy source in the substitution process are separated by about 
five decades and coincide with the upper turning points usually 
attributed to the Kondratieff long wave. The animal feed require­
ments saturate in the 1870's, coal around 1920, and oil around the 
time of the OPEC energy embargo of the early 1970's. Further­
more, during each of these three saturation periods a new energy 
source passes the 1% market share level: oil in the 1870's, natural 
gas in the 1920's, and nuclear energy during the 1970's. These 
periods coincide with the decades of extreme energy and oil price 
volatility noted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 15. Substitution of Primary Energy Sources, U.S. 
SEASONS OF SATURATION 
Figure 1 6  shows a schematic representation of energy substitu­
tion paths, with the three saturation periods indicated in the figure. 
The upper curve shows three more conventional indicators of the 
long wave: fluctuations around the long term trend in wholesale 
prices, energy intensity (expressed as the ratio of primary energy 
supply divided by GNP), and the flares in energy prices referred to 
earlier. It should be noted that the four energy price flares each 
lasted about two decades and coincided with the saturation phases 
in energy substitution .  This perhaps indicates the major disruptions 
and misadjus tments that eventually lead to an increasing reliance 
on a new family of energy and other related sys tems. 
Figure 17 shows a similar synchronization in the saturation 
phases of the three expansion pulses of transport infrastructures in 
the upper curve with the price flares underneath . The dashed curve 
labeled rate of change will be explained below. Both of these exam­
ples show a significant degree of synchronization in the diffusion of 
transport and energy systems with the fluctuations in price levels that 
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have often been used to mark the turning points of the long waves. 
In our opinion this denotes major techno-economic paradigm shifts; 
the upswing phases are first potentiated by initial social acceptance of 
new technologies and institutions belonging to a given cluster, but 
they are driven by the subsequent pervasive and widespread diffusion. 
CLUSTERS AND FAMILIES 
In the introduction we argued that diffusion clusters can be 
documented internationally and not in just a few selected countries 
or sectors. Figure 18 summarizes our findings from the illustrative 
examples given above and other case studies. We have shown the 
international diffusion bandwagons of railways and automobiles, 
and they are also reproduced in Figure 18, together with the 
development of canals that peaked two centuries ago in a number 
of countries. Given below each area denoting a diffusion cluster is 
a list of the various growth processes that belong to it. As men­
tioned earlier, the focusing is not very pronounced, and there is a 
high degree of  overlap among the various bandwagons due to dif­
ferences in the time constants (M) among individual diffusion pro­
cesses. Nevertheless, three rather clear clusters can be distin­
guished. The first saturates around 1865, the second around 1930, 
and the third is centered a few years away in 1995 . Each cluster is 
converging toward the saturation period. The focusing increases as 
the diffusion cluster matures. In other words, the introduction of 
innovations is associated with great lags between the early and late 
adopters. However, the latecomers appear to achieve faster diffu­
sion rates than the original innovators. We can speak of a pro­
nounced catch-up effect that is convergent toward the saturation, 
indicating three distinct seasons of saturations that coincide with 
the Kondratieff upper turning points. The first one dates to the 
second half of the nineteenth century, indicating that technology 
diffusion was an international phenomenon even before the days of 
multinational corporations and technology transfer and before the 
advent of global communication. 
We have observed some evidence, however, that the extent of 
the absolute diffusion level is much lower for the laggers toward 
the end of the cluster. The saturation density of railroad networks 
of a particular country is lower if the diffusion rate is higher. In 
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other words,  the ultimately achieved railroad density i s  in general 
higher the earlier the railroads are introduced ; leaders achieve the 
highest diffusion levels. We have obse rved the same phenomenon 
in the spread of motorization in different countries , the early inno­
vators ,  such as the United States , have the highest per capita 
density , and the achieved density decreases in proportion to the lag 
in the automobile introduction in other countries . 
In this sense each Kondratieff long wave portrays a barrier to 
diffusion. Most processes sat urate during the end of the inflationary 
period and the onset of the disinvestment phase in the Kondratieff 
wave. Very few di ffusion processes can tunnel through this barrier. 
If it i s  true that this marks the beginning of paradigm shifts,  it is 
not surpr ising that the further diffusion of systems associated with 
the ol d techno-economic development trajectory i s  blocked to make 
way for the new. It is the disruptive c risis of the old that provides 
the fertile ground for new systems to develop . . 
Our working hypothesis is that the diffusion processes within 
each cluster constitute families of interrelated systems that enhance 
each other and promote the pervasiveness of each of the three suc­
cessive di ffusion clusters. In other words, each diffusion cluster is 
a network of interrelated families of socio-technical systems that 
reinforce and build upon each other. Classi fication or a taxonomy 
of each indi vidual innovation , required to make the whole cl uster 
viable , would probably reveal a hiera rchical system with one suc­
cessful diff usion having a positive feedback and catalytic effect on 
the develop ment of ma ny others within the whole cluster. In thi s 
sense clustering of these families is the inevitable and endogenous 
phenomenon resulting fro m the interdependent network structure . 
As point ed o ut by Sch umpeter , the cl ustering is not coincid ental. 
We contend that it is the int erdep endence of individ ual diffusion 
processes that in time also fo cuses each of the th ree clusters. 5 
One evidence for this assumption is the e mpirical distribution 
5 This would also explain the observation of innovation clustering during the lower 
turning point in the long wave (see Kleinknecht, 1989) .  It should be observed that only 
the successful innovations tend to develop in a cluster, while all i nnovations (including 
the failures, namely, those that do not lead to a diffusion process due to the lack of 
acceptance) need not cluster. In fact, most of the innovation studies deal wi th the 
successfu l  ones, although they are presumably only a small fraction of all innovative 
activi ties. 
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of AtS .  We have analyzed two samples of diffusion processes in the 
United States .  Sample A is based on 1 17 case studies performed at 
IIASA, and sample B includes an additional 1 4 8  case s tudies taken 
from the literature, total ing 265 individual diffusion processes . The 
lists do not include only technological, process, and product innova­
tions, but also some social diffusion processes, such as the spread 
of l iteracy. Figure 19 shows the histogram of diffusion rates mea­
sured by AtS.  As can be seen, they range in duration up to 300 
years . But there are very few processes that last longer than a 
century, and thus very few span more than two Kondratieffs .  The 
mean value ranges between 40 and 60 years with a s tandard devia­
tion of about equal magnitude. It should be noted that the largest 
number of diffusion processes last  on the order of between 15 to 
30 years , some of  which we have given for illustrative purposes 
above (e .g. , vehicle fleets or steel production methods) .  In general, 
Ats have a long-tailed d is tribution similar to Pareto or rank-size 
distributions . 
% Frequency 
20 
1 0 
SAMPLE A ( 1 1 7  cases) 
SAMPLE B (265 cases) 
.. _-, 
mean = 57.5 st.dev = 52.5 var = 2758.1  
mean = 4 1 . 0  st.dev = 42.0 var  = 1 7 52.1  
1 5  30  4 5  60 75 9 0  105  1 2 0  1 35 1 5 0  165 1 8 0  1 9 5  2 1 0  2 2 5  2 4 0  2 5 5  270 285 300 
Figure 1 9 .  Histogram of Diffusion Rates for Two Different Samples, U.S. 
t.t 
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The his togram gives one kind of summary about the distribu­
tion of diffusion process . Another possible aggregate measure is the 
average rate of diffusion for the whole economy. This indicator 
would be comparable to the growth rate of the Gross National 
Product. The average diffusion rate measures the pace of change in 
an economy. Figure 20  illustrates how the aggregate measure is 
derived. One possibil ity is to sum up the diffusion rates in a given 
sample of diffusions. The plot  on the top of the figure gives two 
possible (idealized) diffusion processes that converge toward satura­
tion, and the middle plot gives their diffusion rates (slopes) .  The 
lower plot illustrates the shape of the sum of the two diffusion rates 
and the dotted curve their average diffusion rates. 
Figure 21 gives the aggregate diffusion rates of sample A with 
1 1 7  diffusion processes. It portrays clear peaks and troughs, while 
the longer-term trend indicates an increase in aggregate level of 
diffusion. This could, however, be the artifact of the sample .  There 
are simply more diffusion processes documented for the last 
hundred than the previous hundred years . Although we are taking 
averages ,  the higher number of overlapping processes in one 
interval could result in a higher aggregate diffusion rate . Each peak 
characterizes the beginning of the saturation of the corresponding 
cluster or family of diffusion processes.  The reason why the curve 
tapers off on the right of the plot  (after the present time) is that 
some diffusion processes with very long t:..ts could be assumed to 
continue in the future. Presumably, many innovations have 
emerged during the last decades that may turn out to be successful , 
and if they were included perhaps we could expect a trend reversal 
in the rate-of-change curve sometime after the mid- 1 990's .  The 
turning points in the evolu tion of this new empirical measure of 
the long-term rate of change are consistent with some of the 
turning points identified by a number of long wave researchers 
(e.g. , van Duijn, 1 983;  Goldstein 1 988 ;  Marchetti , 1 983;  Nakiceno­
vic, 1 984; and V2sko, 1 987) .  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The patterns of technological change and diffusion of innova­
tions appear to be consistent with the hypothesis of long waves in 
economic development. We have noted a certain degree of regular i­
ty, correlation, and recurrence within each family of interrelated 
technologies, although the clustering or bundling is not very rigid. 
There is stronger evidence for the synchronization in the saturation 
of diffusion processes rather than in their emergence, so that the 
focusing increases as the systems mature. In other  words, the time 
span between the beginning of the diffusion of new pervasive sys­
tems, that is, between the leaders and the laggers, tends to decrease 
as the diffusion p rogresses, so that the process appears much more 
focused toward the saturation phase. This visible catch-up effect 
refers only to the relative diffusion rates and not to the absolute 
levels of diffusion. The leaders usually achieve higher diffusion 
levels and the followers levels that are lower roughly in proportion 
to the lag in the introduction of a given innovation. 
The results, however, cannot be conclusive before explicit 
linkages are established between the individual diffusion processes 
342 AmulJ Crabler & Nebojla Nakicenovic 
that constitute each of the three described clusters of techno-econo­
mic development. A taxonomy and establishment of hierarchies 
within each cluster could be a fruitful route toward determining the 
relationships and driving forces behind the clustering effect ob­
served in our samples of innovation diffusions . This could perhaps 
answer some of the questions that emerge from the analysis. For 
example, why are the clusters more focused towards what we called 
the Kondratieff barrier? Alternatively, under which conditions 
could unbundling occur and perhaps lead to a more even pace of 
structural change? The overall development trajectory is punctuated 
by crises that emerge in the transition from an old saturating 
cluster to a new but uncertain development path, but this may 
simply be an inherent feature of the evolutionary processes that 
govern social behavior. 
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